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COMMENT*

The Incriminating Sound of Silence:
A Need for Protection of Post-Arrest,
Pre-Miranda Silence
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I. INTRODUCTION
The right to remain silent is a well-known constitutional right in
the United States, in large part because of the pervasive presence of
Miranda warnings in crime dramas on television and in the media.1
However, it is unlikely that the average lay person’s understanding of
the right to remain silent extends much beyond a general awareness
that it exists. Some of the not-so-obvious aspects of the right to silence
include its purpose—particularly, to facilitate the privilege against
self-incrimination2—and its protections, including the right to not
have that silence used against the individual at trial.3 One of the biggest complexities of the right to remain silent, troubling lay persons as
well as experienced attorneys, is determining when the right is
activated.
It is apparent that defendants have the right to remain silent once
they are informed of their Miranda rights because the right is expressly stated in the warnings. However, the clarity disappears when
discussing silence prior to Miranda warnings. Federal circuit courts
have faced the issue of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence for decades
yet continue to diverge sharply in their opinions.4 Some, like the
Eighth Circuit, take a restrictive view of the right to remain silent,
and the Fifth Amendment in general, and permit the prosecution to
use evidence of a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence in any
way it chooses—including to prove the defendant’s guilt.5 Other circuits, reading the Fifth Amendment broadly, find that the right to remain silent begins as early as arrest. As a result, these circuits forbid
the prosecution from using post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence during its
case-in-chief because such use would violate the defendant’s Fifth
Amendment rights.6
The divide among circuit courts is particularly problematic because
of its substantial effect on criminal defendants. For instance, the current lack of consistency prevents arrestees from knowing how to protect their innocence at the time of arrest. Courts should consistently
apply constitutional rules throughout the United States. The rules regarding the right to remain silent are constitutional because the right
stems from the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination, and thus, courts must uniformly apply the right to remain silent.
1. See Adam M. Hapner, Comment, You Have the Right To Remain Silent, but Anything You Don’t Say May Be Used Against You: The Admissibility of Silence as
Evidence After Salinas v. Texas, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1763, 1775 (2014).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See infra section IV.A.
6. See infra section IV.B.
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This Comment will argue that a defendant’s right to remain silent
under the Fifth Amendment includes silence occurring after arrest but
before receipt of the Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court should
grant certiorari to definitively resolve this circuit split and prevent the
further violation of defendants’ rights by prosecutors’ use of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to prove guilt. Part II of this Comment will
provide an overview of the source and creation of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause and the development of the right to
silence prior to Miranda v. Arizona in 1966. Part III will discuss the
two types of pre-Miranda silence that the Supreme Court has addressed. The first type permits pre-arrest silence to be used as substantive evidence of guilt and, consequently, to impeach a defendant.
The second type permits post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence solely to impeach a defendant. Part IV will discuss the various viewpoints surrounding the circuit court split on the use of post-arrest, pre-Miranda
silence during the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Part V will argue that
the right to remain silent encompasses post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence and, as a result, prevents the prosecution from using such silence as substantive evidence of guilt against defendants. Part VI will
conclude with a discussion of Berghuis v. Thompkins and the issues
that the Supreme Court’s unclear opinion poses for the protection of
post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence.
II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO REMAIN
SILENT
To understand the conflict surrounding the right to remain silent,
it is necessary to examine the roots of the privilege against self-incrimination, starting when the conflict arose centuries ago in England
and culminating with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Miranda v. Arizona.7 Some scholars argue that the theory against
self-incrimination, and in turn the right to remain silent, was established in English ecclesiastical courts.8 Ecclesiastical courts in England operated on the inquisitorial system of justice beginning as
early as the thirteenth century.9 The inquisitorial system is unique in
comparison to English and American courts today because it forced
7. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. See, e.g., Alfredo Garcia, The Fifth Amendment: A Comprehensive and Historical
Approach, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 209, 218 (1998) (discussing Leonard W. Levy’s account of the historical origins of the Fifth Amendment in Levy’s book, Origins of
the Fifth Amendment: The Right Against Self-Incrimination).
9. See Kristen Tolan, The Fear of Foreign Prosecution Is Beyond the Scope of the
Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Supreme Court Finalized the Debate in United States v. Balsys, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 197, 198
(1999).
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criminal defendants to self-incriminate.10 To facilitate this practice,
ecclesiastical courts administered the oath ex officio, which compelled
defendants to answer questions fully and truthfully and, therefore, to
admit culpability.11 Alleged wrongdoers could not, without severe
repercussions, refuse to take the oath.12 This produced a “cruel
trilemma” of sorts when alleged wrongdoers were confronted with the
oath because their only options were to (1) tell the truth and incriminate themselves; (2) lie and be accused of perjury; or (3) stay silent
and be punished with a presumption of guilt—or worse, be killed.13
In response to the introduction of the oath and its severe consequences, advocates for another system of law enforcement, the accusatorial system, quickly grew in number.14 Accusatorial criminal justice
focuses on testimony by witnesses as opposed to testimony exclusively
by the accused.15 Arguments in favor of an accusatorial system were
spearheaded by an opposition to the oath ex officio and premised on
the maxim nemo tenetur prodere seipsum, meaning no man is bound to
accuse himself.16
Despite consistent protests, the inquisitorial system and the oath
ex officio continued to dominate criminal justice in ecclesiastical
courts.17 It was not until the seventeenth century that accusatorial
system advocates in England gained some headway. In 1637, John
Lilburne asserted the privilege against self-incrimination as a defense
in his criminal trial after refusing to take the oath.18 Lilburne, a fierce
advocate for the accusatorial system, claimed throughout his proceedings that “no man’s conscience ought to be racked by oaths imposed, to
10. See Slater Elza, The Interplay Between Civil and Criminal Law, 91 ADVOCATE:
STATE BAR LITIG. SECTION REP., Summer 2020, at 185.
11. See Garcia, supra note 8, at 218. Making this process even more callous is the fact
that alleged wrongdoers were not informed of the crime that they were accused of
until after the oath ex officio was administered. Elza, supra note 10.
12. See Garcia, supra note 8, at 219. England’s Court of High Commission created a
rule to ensure that defendants took the oath. The pro confesso rule stated that a
failure to answer all questions truthfully and accurately was tantamount to an
admission of guilt. Id. The Commission believed this rule only targeted the guilty
because of an assumption that the truth would not hurt the innocent. Id.
13. Cf. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 53, 55 (1964) (discussing the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, and contempt as a supporting basis for the
Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination).
14. See Tolan, supra note 9.
15. See Elza, supra note 10.
16. Tolan, supra note 9 (noting the death of John Lambert in 1537 after he refused to
answer questions under the oath).
17. See id.
18. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459 (1966); Garcia, supra note 8,
at 219; Tolan, supra note 9, at 199. Tolan’s account records the year of the
Lilburne trial as 1649, as opposed to Chief Justice Warren’s date of 1637 in Miranda. The inconsistency likely is because Lilburne was tried four times in total.
Garcia, supra note 8, at 219.
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answer to questions concerning himself in matters criminal, or pretended to be so.”19 Lilburne’s trial sparked Parliament’s eradication of
the oath and the recognition of the privilege against self-incrimination
in English ecclesiastical and common law courts.20
Acceptance of the principle that no man should be bound to accuse
himself made its way to the colonies. In 1791, Congress incorporated
this principle into the United States Constitution by way of the Fifth
Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause.21 The Fifth Amendment
reads in part: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself . . . .”22 The primary evil the Framers
intended to prevent was the encroachment on civil liberties, particularly the use of torture to coerce criminal confessions.23 Although not
explicit, the exclusion of involuntary confessions was grounded in the
choice to enforce criminal laws under an accusatorial system—“a system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently
and freely secured.”24
Despite the clear source of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, ambiguity has continually surrounded its application. A
discussion of two landmark cases will help to lay a foundation for why
the right to remain silent exists at the time of arrest, regardless of the
receipt of Miranda warnings, and thus prevents the use of post-arrest,
pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt.25 The Fifth
Amendment has always encompassed the right to refuse to testify
against oneself at trial. However, the consequence of exercising this
right was not determined until Griffin v. California.26 In Griffin, the
19. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459 (citing THE LEVELLER TRACTS 1647–1653, at 454 (William Haller & Godfrey Davies eds., 1944)).
20. See generally id.; Garcia, supra note 8, at 220; Tolan, supra note 9, at 199.
21. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459; Tracey Maclin, The Prophylactic Fifth Amendment,
97 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1062 (2017).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 447–49 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment was written in part to prevent any Congress, any
court, and any prosecutor from prying open the lips of an accused to make incriminating statements against his will.”).
24. Cynthia Picou, Miranda and Escobedo: Warren v. Burger Court Decisions on 5th
Amendment Rights, 4 S.U. L. REV. 175, 177 (1977) (quoting Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534, 540–41 (1961)).
25. It is important to note that many Supreme Court decisions beyond the two cases
discussed in this Comment played important roles in the development of and explanation for Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. For instance, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), extended the
privilege against self-incrimination to state criminal defendants. See Frank R.
Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Standing Mute at Arrest as Evidence of Guilt:
The “Right to Silence” Under Attack, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 12 (2007). However, a
discussion of every Fifth Amendment case is impractical and unnecessary for the
purposes of this Comment.
26. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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defendant, on trial for murder, exercised his Fifth Amendment right
and did not testify at trial. The prosecutor made multiple suggestive
comments to the jury regarding the defendant’s failure to testify. The
defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
death.
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the prosecutor’s comments regarding the defendant’s refusal to testify at trial violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.27 The Court reasoned that allowing such comments
would “cut[ ] down on the privilege by making its assertion costly,”28
thus defeating the main purpose of the right. Additionally, the Supreme Court held that instructing juries to use a defendant’s refusal
to testify as evidence of guilt violated the Self-Incrimination Clause.29
As a consequence, prosecutors and judges are forbidden from punishing defendants for exercising their constitutional right against selfincrimination by insinuating that their silence is an admission of
guilt.
In 1966, just one year after Griffin, the Supreme Court confirmed
in a groundbreaking decision that the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause prohibited compelled confessions beyond the courtroom
walls.30 In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court made clear that defendants
can exercise the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination in police custodial interrogations.31 In order to restrain the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial interrogations and provide
defendants a “full opportunity to exercise the privilege against selfincrimination,”32 the Miranda Court stated that police must, among
other things, notify defendants of their right to remain silent and not
answer questions.33 As a result of this decision, any statements made
27. Id. at 615. The Court also noted that allowing comments on a defendant’s failure
to testify is a “remnant of the ‘inquisitorial system of criminal justice,’ which the
Fifth Amendment outlaws.” Id. at 614 (citation omitted) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
28. Id. at 614; see also Robin B. Murphy, Silence as Self-Incrimination After Salinas
v. Texas, 102 ILL. B.J. 184, 185 (2014) (“[The prosecution’s] comments, and the
judge’s silent acceptance, [resulted in] a penalty for exercising a constitutional
right . . . .”).
29. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615.
30. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (“[T]here can be no doubt that
the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings
and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is
curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate
themselves.”).
31. Id. (reasoning that the privilege should also be available in custodial interrogations, despite the abandonment of physical coercion, because custodial interrogations by police still present a cause for alarm).
32. Id.
33. Id. In addition to notifying individuals in custody of their right to remain silent,
police must also explain that they have a right to counsel and that “anything said
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by defendants who were not informed of or did not voluntarily waive
their Miranda rights are inadmissible at trial.34 Further, the Court
cited Griffin and stated that at trial, the prosecution is barred from
taking advantage of a defendant’s silence during a custodial interrogation, as it would penalize the exercise of a constitutional right.35
III. SILENCE PRIOR TO MIRANDA WARNINGS
It is clear from Miranda and Griffin that defendants have a right
to remain silent during custodial interrogations and at trial and that
prosecutors may not use defendants’ silence against them. However, a
defendant who remains silent prior to receiving their Miranda warnings is not always afforded the same protection. The level of protection
sometimes depends on the prosecution’s purpose for offering the evidence of silence; the prosecutor may offer it for impeachment purposes
or to show a defendant’s guilt in their case-in-chief.
A.

Pre-Arrest Silence as Substantive Evidence of Guilt

A common example of pre-arrest silence arises when an individual
voluntarily goes to the police station for an interview. Because the individual is free to leave at any time, the interview is considered noncustodial in nature. In Salinas v. Texas, Salinas, a murder suspect,
voluntarily went to the police station for an interview.36 Both Salinas
and the police agreed that the interview was noncustodial and Salinas
was not read his Miranda rights.37 Salinas answered the police officer’s questions for almost the entire hour-long interview, but when a
question arose regarding a potential ballistics test comparing Salinas’s shotgun to the shells from the crime scene, Salinas remained
silent.38 A few days after the interview, police charged Salinas with
murder.39 At trial, the prosecution commented on Salinas’s silence fol-

34.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

can and will be used against the individual in court.” Id. at 469. Beside the purposes described in the text above, the Miranda warnings also inform individuals
in custody of the consequences of waiving their right to remain silent.
Id. at 474 (“[A]ny statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot
be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.”); see Geoffrey B.
Fehling, Note, Verdugo, Where’d You Go?: Stoot v. City of Everett and Evaluating
Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Civil Liability Violations, 18 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 481, 491 (2011).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 n.37; see also Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284
(1986) (reiterating that the prosecution cannot use a defendant’s post-Miranda
silence as evidence of guilt in its case-in-chief).
Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 182 (2013).
Id.
Id. Instead of answering the question, Salinas “[l]ooked down at the floor, shuffled his feet, bit his bottom lip, cl[e]nched his hands in his lap, [and] began to
tighten up.” Id.
Id. Immediately following the interview, Salinas was arrested on traffic violation
charges that were soon dismissed. After receiving information that Salinas con-
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lowing the ballistics question to suggest his guilt, and the jury found
Salinas guilty.40 Salinas appealed, maintaining that comments regarding his pre-arrest silence during the prosecution’s case-in-chief violated his Fifth Amendment rights.41
The Supreme Court disagreed with Salinas’s argument. A plurality
of justices found the prosecution’s use of Salinas’s pre-arrest silence as
evidence of guilt in its case-in-chief was permitted because Salinas
failed to expressly and timely assert the privilege—a requirement
that the Court refers to as the “express invocation requirement.”42
Justice Alito, writing for the plurality, explained that there are only
two recognized exceptions to the express invocation requirement and a
precustodial interview is not one of them.43 Salinas did not retain his
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent because he did not state during his noncustodial interview that he was exercising that right by
declining to answer.44 Therefore, the Court held that Salinas had no
Fifth Amendment claim.45
In a concurrence, Justice Thomas also found no Fifth Amendment
violation but for another reason.46 Justice Thomas stated that even if
Salinas had expressly invoked the privilege during his interview,
there would be no violation because the prosecution’s comments at
trial did not compel Salinas’s self-incriminatory testimony, the only
protection guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.47 Under either viewpoint, it remains clear that the prosecution can use a defendant’s silence or refusal to answer questions prior to arrest as evidence of guilt
in its case-in-chief.

40.
41.
42.
43.

44.
45.

46.
47.

fessed to the killings, police charged Salinas with murder, but he had already fled
town. Police were unable to locate and arrest Salinas on the murder charges for
another fourteen years.
Id.
Id. at 182–83.
Id. at 183–84; see also discussion infra section V.D (discussing the express invocation requirement stemming from Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010)).
Salinas, 570 U.S. at 184 (explaining that the two recognized exceptions to the
express invocation requirement are reserved for criminal defendants at trial and
suspects in an “unwarned custodial interrogation”).
Id. at 191.
Id. It is important to note that the plurality failed to decide the true issue posed
by Salinas, namely, “whether the prosecution may use a defendant’s assertion of
the privilege against self-incrimination during a noncustodial police interview as
part of its case in chief.” Id. at 183. Justice Alito concluded that they could not
reach that question because Salinas never attempted to invoke the privilege. As a
result, the Court based its decision against Salinas on his failure to assert the
privilege. Id. at 191.
Id. at 191–92 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 192 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Salinas’ claim would fail even if he had invoked the privilege because the prosecutor’s comments regarding his precustodial
silence did not compel him to give self-incriminating testimony.”); see also Murphy, supra note 28, at 186 (discussing Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion).
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Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence for Impeachment
Purposes

The protection of a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence
has raised further debate, which the Supreme Court resolved, to some
extent, in Fletcher v. Weir.48 The defendant, Weir, got into a fight at a
nightclub and stabbed another patron who later died from the
wounds.49 Weir did not provide any explanation or defense at arrest.50
Weir took the stand at trial and claimed that the stabbing was done in
self-defense and accidental, but on cross-examination, the prosecution
questioned why Weir did not state this defense when police arrested
him.51 The jury subsequently convicted Weir of manslaughter.52
On appeal, Weir contested the prosecution’s use of his post-arrest
silence for purposes of impeachment, and the Sixth Circuit held that
“a defendant cannot be impeached by use of his post-arrest silence
even if no Miranda warnings had been given.”53 The Supreme Court
reversed, stating that it does not “violate[ ] due process of law for a
State to permit cross-examination as to post-arrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand.”54 The Court reached this decision
by distinguishing Weir from Doyle v. Ohio.55 In Doyle, the Court held
that use of a defendant’s post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes violates the Fifth Amendment.56 The Court stated that it is
“fundamentally unfair” to introduce post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes because the Miranda warnings convey an implicit promise that “silence will carry no penalty.”57 The chief
difference between Weir and Doyle, the Court noted, is that Doyle’s
silence occurred after the police had informed him of his Miranda
rights whereas Weir’s silence occurred beforehand.58

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
Id.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 603–04.
Id. at 604.
Id. at 604 (citing Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126, 1130 (6th Cir. 1981)).
Id. at 607.
Id. at 604–06; Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (holding that the prosecution
cannot use a defendant’s post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes).
56. Weir, 455 U.S. at 605.
57. Id. (quoting Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618).
58. Id.; see also Megan E. Wamsley, Comment, You [Might] Have the Right To Remain Silent: Examining the Miranda Problem (United States v. Wright, 777 F.3d
769 (5th Cir. 2015)), 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 923, 929 (2016) (reasoning that the admissibility of pre-Miranda silence as impeachment evidence could be inferred from
the Court’s ban on post-Miranda silence as evidence of impeachment in Doyle).
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IV. CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT: POST-ARREST, PRE-MIRANDA
SILENCE AS EVIDENCE OF GUILT
Though the Supreme Court is clear regarding the prosecution’s use
of a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence for impeachment
purposes, the Court has yet to resolve whether the prosecution can use
post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as evidence of guilt in its case-inchief. Decades-long, harsh disagreement on this issue among circuit
courts adds to the confusion,59 yet the Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to address the issue despite numerous writs of
certiorari.60
A.

Circuit Courts Allowing Use of Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda
Silence as Evidence of Guilt

The Fourth Circuit, Eighth Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit are
among the federal circuit courts of appeals that permit the prosecution to introduce a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as evidence of guilt in its case-in-chief. The Eighth Circuit held in United
States v. Frazier that post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence can be used as
substantive evidence of guilt.61 There, state troopers searched Frazier’s U-Haul at a gas station off of Interstate 80 in Nebraska.62 Behind furniture, state troopers found boxes containing controlled
substances.63 They subsequently arrested Frazier and took him to the
state patrol office for an interview where he was then read his Miranda rights.64 During its case-in-chief at trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of Frazier’s reaction, or lack thereof, when the officers
informed Frazier of his arrest for the possession of drugs. In particular, the prosecution suggested that Frazier’s failure to show emotion
or provide any explanation suggested his guilt.65
59. Compare United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding use of a
defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as evidence of guilt does not violate
a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights), with United States v. Whitehead, 200
F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding use of a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda
silence as evidence of guilt violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to
silence).
60. See, e.g., Palacios-Solis v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 162 (2020) (denying certiorari); Osuna-Zepeda v. United States, 547 U.S. 1056 (2006) (denying certiorari);
United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991) (addressing the issue in
1991); United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir. 1985) (addressing the
issue in 1985).
61. Frazier, 408 F.3d at 1111.
62. Id. at 1107.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1109; see also Marc Scott Hennes, Note, Manipulating Miranda: United
States v. Frazier and the Case-in-Chief Use of Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence,
92 CORNELL L. REV. 1013, 1031 (2007) (“[T]he prosecutor argued that Frazier’s
silence in response to the discovery of the drugs was a significant factor that
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Frazier appealed the prosecution’s use of this silence, arguing that
it violated his right against self-incrimination.66 The Eighth Circuit
reframed the inquiry as whether Frazier was under “government-imposed compulsion to speak” during and immediately after his arrest.67
The court concluded that Frazier was not under compulsion to speak
at this time; as a result, his Fifth Amendment rights were not violated.68 The circuit court’s reasoning appears to be based on a single
line from Weir: “[A]n arrest by itself is not governmental action that
implicitly induces a defendant to remain silent.”69 The Eighth Circuit
confirmed its holding in Frazier just a few months later in United
States v. Osuna-Zepeda.70 Again, the court relied on the same statement from Weir without providing additional analysis.71
The Eighth Circuit is not the only federal circuit court to rely on
Weir in this way. The Fourth Circuit erroneously interpreted Weir’s
precedent to conclude that a defendant’s silence is admissible as substantive evidence if they have not yet received their Miranda warnings at the time of such silence. In United States v. Love, the Fourth
Circuit stated that, in Weir, the Supreme Court permitted “testimony
concerning a defendant’s silence where the defendant has not ‘received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he remained
silent immediately after his arrest.’ ”72 This interpretation fails to recognize that the silence in Weir was used solely to impeach the defen-

66.
67.

68.
69.

70.

71.
72.

should lead the jury to conclude that Frazier lied about not knowing that drugs
were hidden in the truck.”).
Frazier, 408 F.3d at 1109.
Id. at 1110–11 (“The crux of our inquiry today is to determine at what point a
defendant is under ‘official compulsion to speak’ because silence in the face of
such compulsion constitutes a ‘statement’ for purposes of a Fifth Amendment inquiry.”); see also Hennes, supra note 65 (discussing the court’s reframing of the
inquiry posed by Frazier on appeal to reach its desired conclusion).
Frazier, 408 F.3d at 1111.
Id. (citing Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606 (1982)). It is interesting to note that
the Eighth Circuit expressly acknowledges that the Supreme Court’s holding in
Weir is confined to the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s silence for impeachment
purposes. The court does not see this as limiting. Instead, it chooses to unilaterally extend Weir to use of such silence to prove guilt without providing any further analysis than this one line.
United States v. Osuna-Zepeda, 416 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2005). In Osuna-Zepeda,
police arrested the defendant outside of a Target store for the possession of a
controlled substance and took him into Target’s security room to search his person. During its case-in-chief at trial, the prosecution questioned the officer regarding Osuna-Zepeda’s reaction in the Target security room following his arrest
but before he received his Miranda rights. The officer testified that OsunaZepeda made no statements during this time. Id. at 840–41.
Id. at 844.
United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting Fletcher v.
Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 605 (1982)).

2021]

INCRIMINATING SOUND OF SILENCE

535

dant’s testimony—not to prove the defendant’s guilt.73 Nevertheless,
the Fourth Circuit continually cites Love when permitting the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt.74
In authorizing the use of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as evidence of guilt, the Eleventh Circuit boldly conceded that it went “a
step further” than the Supreme Court.75 The Eleventh Circuit based
its decision in United States v. Wilchcombe on its previous statement
in United States v. Rivera: “[T]he government may comment on a defendant’s silence when it occurs after arrest, but before Miranda
warnings are given.”76 The Eleventh Circuit has continued to uphold
its precedent set forth in Rivera and Wilchcombe despite acknowledgement of the deeply entrenched circuit court split on the issue.77
B.

Circuit Courts Prohibiting Use of Post-Arrest, PreMiranda Silence as Evidence of Guilt

In contrast to the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts,
which hold that a defendant’s right to remain silent is not protected
under the Fifth Amendment until the receipt of Miranda warnings,
the Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit Courts find that the right to silence is activated much sooner. These federal appellate courts have
held that the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as evidence of guilt in its case-in-chief violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. However, there are two differing
viewpoints among these courts regarding the extent of the right to remain silent prior to the receipt of Miranda warnings.
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Whitehead78 exemplifies the first view on this side of the post-arrest, pre-Miranda si73. See Herrmann & Speer, supra note 25, at 17–19 (noting how the Fourth Circuit,
unlike the Eighth Circuit, failed to recognize that Weir dealt with the use of silence to impeach a defendant rather than as substantive evidence of guilt); see
also supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s recognition that the Supreme Court’s holding in Weir was confined to the use of silence
for impeachment purposes).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Cornwell, 418 F. App’x 224, 227 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding
no Fifth Amendment violation when the prosecution entered video footage into
evidence to show the defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence).
75. United States v. Wilchcombe, 838 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2016).
76. Id. at 1194 (quoting United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.
1991)). The Eleventh Circuit offers little, if any, analysis to support its conclusion
in Rivera. This may be in part because the record was unclear about whether the
defendant had been placed in custody. Therefore, the circuit court made two definitive statements. First, pre-arrest silence can be used as evidence of guilt. Second, post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence can also be used as evidence of guilt. See
Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1567–68.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020).
78. United States v. Whitehead, 200 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2000).
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lence debate. In Whitehead, the court found that the prosecutor’s
comments regarding the defendant’s post-arrest silence violated the
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights, regardless of when Miranda
warnings were given.79 The Ninth Circuit explained its reasoning one
year later in United States v. Velarde-Gomez.80 The court pointed out
that “the right to remain silent derives from the Constitution and not
from the Miranda warnings themselves.”81 Furthermore, since Miranda warnings are merely a “prophylactic” safeguard against self-incrimination,82 the Ninth Circuit determined that “a right to remain
silent in the face of government questioning” exists as soon as the individual is in police custody.83 Thus, post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence
cannot be discussed during the prosecution’s case-in-chief.84
In Velarde-Gomez, the defendant did not respond when the police
confronted him about the drugs found in his car, and the court frequently specifies that Velarde-Gomez’s silence occurred in the face of
questioning.85 This suggests that the Ninth Circuit believes evidence
must show that the self-incriminating silence was prompted by law
enforcement action for the Fifth Amendment’s protections against
compelled self-incrimination to apply—Velarde-Gomez’s right to silence was only triggered once he was questioned. Therefore, the critical inquiry seems to be whether there was any confrontation or
questioning after arrest, notwithstanding the receipt of Miranda
warnings. In Velarde-Gomez, the defendant was already arrested at
the time of confrontation. Thus, his silence was protected and could
not be used against him at trial.
79. Id. at 636–39. The defendant was silent after he was taken into custody but
before he was given his Miranda warnings, and the trial court allowed the prosecution to use this silence to demonstrate the defendant’s knowledge of the drugs
concealed in his car and, therefore, his guilt. Though the court of appeals found
that the trial court erred when it admitted this evidence, Whitehead did not sufficiently demonstrate that the error affected the outcome and the error did not
involve substantial rights. Therefore, the court did not reverse the lower court’s
verdict. Id. at 639–40.
80. United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2001). In VelardeGomez, the prosecution commented on the defendant’s “lack of response” during
its case-in-chief. The Ninth Circuit made clear that evidence of a lack of response
is the same as evidence of silence for Fifth Amendment purposes. Id. at 1031.
81. Id. at 1029.
82. Id. (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976)).
83. Id. The Ninth Circuit also cites the Miranda Court’s statement regarding silence
in the face of questioning: “The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the
fact that [the defendant] stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.” Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966)).
84. Id. at 1032.
85. Id. at 1030–31; see id. at 1029 (“silent in the face of government questioning”); id.
at 1030 (“pre-Miranda questioning”); id. at 1031 (“silent in the face of confrontation”); id. at 1032 (“silence in the face of questioning”).
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The D.C. Circuit arguably takes a more liberal view of the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, finding that the right to
pretrial silence exists at all times after a defendant is in custody, even
if there has been no questioning.86 In United States v. Moore,87 the
prosecution made multiple comments regarding the defendant’s failure to react or make a statement when police officers found guns and
drugs in his car.88 The D.C. Circuit held that mention of such postcustody silence violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights.89
Since the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly ruled on post-arrest,
pre-Miranda silence, the circuit court began its analysis with a discussion of Griffin and Miranda and reasoned that those cases clearly
hold that a defendant’s silence, starting at least at the time of custodial interrogation, cannot be used as evidence of guilt due to the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.90
The D.C. Circuit Court went on to say that actual questioning,
such as in a custodial interrogation, is not the firm starting point for
the right to pretrial silence.91 The distinction between use of silence
for impeachment purposes and use of silence as substantive evidence
of guilt was determinative to the court’s decision. The D.C. Circuit rejected the government’s argument that Doyle stands for the proposition that all pre-Miranda silence is unprotected.92 Judge Sentelle,
writing for the majority, explained that “Doyle is an exception to an
exception to the general rule”:
The general rule regarding a defendant’s silence is that it cannot be used. The
defendant’s testifying creates an exception allowing the testimony to be used
for the purpose of impeachment. The presence of the Miranda warning before

86. See United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385–89 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[C]ustody
and not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence
under Miranda.”). The D.C. Circuit Court used the term “custody” rather than
“arrest” because though in police custody, it is unclear whether the defendant in
Moore was actually under arrest at the time of his silence. The D.C. Circuit’s
holding in Moore still supports the proposition that post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence cannot be used as substantive evidence of guilt because any post-arrest silence would be post-custody silence as well.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 384. The prosecution argued that if Moore was really innocent and had not
known about the drugs, he would have made comments such as to that effect or
at the very least shown some surprise. Id.
89. Id. at 385.
90. Id.
91. Id. (noting that no Supreme Court case, including Miranda, has suggested that
questioning is the triggering event for the right to remain silent).
92. Id. at 386 (“[T]he Doyle Court noted that even ‘the State does not suggest petitioners’ silence could be used as evidence of guilt,’ but only contended that it was
necessary for cross-examination and impeachment of ‘petitioners’ exculpatory
story.’” (quoting Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976))).
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the silence causes an estoppel that restores to the defendant the protection
against the use of the silence.93

By this reasoning, the D.C. Circuit determined that the receipt of Miranda warnings is only significant as to whether silence can be used
to impeach a defendant’s testimony if he takes the stand at trial.94
The D.C. Circuit makes clear in Moore that custody, rather than the
receipt of Miranda warnings, marks the beginning of a defendant’s
right to remain silent.95 Implicitly, the D.C. Circuit refused to create
another exception to the general rule (on top of the impeachment exception from Doyle and Weir) to allow use of a defendant’s post-custody, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt.
The D.C. Circuit arguably goes a step farther than the Ninth Circuit by extending the right to remain silent to the first moment a defendant is in custody, regardless of whether the defendant’s silence is
a response to government questioning. The Seventh Circuit also prohibits use of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence
of guilt but does so with less scrutiny than the Ninth Circuit and D.C.
Circuit.96 Despite the nuances and difference in application, all three
courts stand for the proposition that the prosecution cannot introduce
post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as evidence of the defendant’s guilt.
V. ANALYSIS
The issue presented in these cases is straightforward: can the prosecution use evidence that a defendant remained silent after arrest but
before receipt of their Miranda warnings as substantive evidence of
guilt?97 Still, circuit courts have been unable to agree on a resolution
for decades, leading to a variety of viewpoints on both sides of the is93. Id. at 387; see also David S. Romantz, “You Have the Right To Remain Silent”: A
Case for the Use of Silence as Substantive Proof of the Criminal Defendant’s Guilt,
38 IND. L. REV. 1, 34 n.180 (2005) (discussing Judge Sentelle’s “exception to an
exception to the general rule” analysis).
94. Moore, 104 F.3d at 386 (“It is plain that the significance of the Miranda warnings
in establishing the ability of the prosecution to use the defendant’s silence is limited to impeachment.”).
95. Id. at 385. It is important to note, again, that the D.C. Circuit held that the right
to remain silent is triggered when a defendant is in custody, not on arrest. While
typically these two events happen almost simultaneously, the facts in Moore
show that a person can be in custody before they are officially under arrest. See
id. at 388–89. However, because custody would occur prior to, if not contemporaneous with, arrest, the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Moore supports the proposition
that post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence cannot be used as substantive evidence of
guilt.
96. See United States v. Hernandez, 948 F.2d 316, 322–25 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding
that introduction of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as evidence of guilt is a constitutional violation although the error was harmless); see also Hennes, supra
note 65, at 1028–30 (noting that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hernandez is
substantially similar to the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion in Moore).
97. Silence includes a failure to react or make a statement.
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sue.98 In light of the harsh divide among circuit courts, the Supreme
Court compounds this problem by continuously refusing to provide a
clear answer that can be applied uniformly across the country.99 Instead, the current circuit court split on this issue produces vast inconsistencies in how post-arrest silence is treated, which ignites many
problems. Mainly, the difference in circuit court interpretation results
in a complete failure to provide any semblance of clarity regarding
how an arrestee should act and respond at the time of arrest until
receipt of their Miranda warnings in order to protect their innocence.
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to a case posing the
issue of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of
guilt in order to create a nationally uniform rule and resolve these
problems. Furthermore, this Comment proposes that the correct resolution is to affirmatively hold that a defendant’s right to remain silent
commences at the time of arrest rather than at the receipt of their
Miranda warnings. The following arguments support such an
interpretation.
A.

Miranda as a Mere Reminder

Many circuit courts that permit prosecutorial use of post-arrest,
pre-Miranda silence rely on the proposition that the Miranda warnings mark the beginning of the privilege against self-incrimination,
including the right to remain silent.100 However, this argument is
flawed in two ways. First, the Fifth Amendment, not Miranda, is at
the heart of the right to remain silent. For the Fifth Amendment’s
privilege against self-incrimination to carry any weight, it is necessary
to also provide a right to remain silent.101 The two go hand in hand:
no doubt one of the best ways to avoid self-incrimination is to remain
silent. Limits on the right to remain silent are direct limits on the
right to prevent self-incrimination. If an individual is penalized
whether they remain silent or not, they are compelled to be a witness
against themselves, and it is illogical to conclude that some sort of
trigger is required before the Fifth Amendment’s protections are activated. Thus, courts must read the right to remain silent as an implicit
98. See supra Part IV.
99. See cases cited supra note 60 (listing just a few instances in which the Supreme
Court denied certiorari to cases involving post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as
substantive evidence of guilt).
100. See United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir. 1985).
101. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right
To Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2625 (1996) (“The privilege is fulfilled
only when the person is guaranteed the right to remain silent unless he chooses
to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.” (quoting Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966))).
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yet inherent right within the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against
self-incrimination.102
Second, it is both questionable and problematic that the Miranda
warnings, created 175 years after the enactment of the Fifth Amendment, are necessary for the right to remain silent. The fact that the
Miranda warnings require police to expressly inform defendants of
their right to silence in no way suggests that the Miranda Court intended these warnings to be the definitive starting point of Fifth
Amendment rights.103 The most reasonable reading of Miranda suggests the Supreme Court created a notification procedure for a vulnerable time to protect rights that already existed.104 The Miranda Court
supplied multiple statements supporting the notion that the Miranda
warnings are just a reminder of a pre-existing right to remain silent—
not the beginning of it. Most telling is the Supreme Court’s statement
that “the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal
court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in
which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from
being compelled to incriminate themselves.”105 While the Court made
clear that custodial interrogations were one such setting, the Court
did not exclude other post-arrest settings prior to a custodial interrogation. Additionally, the Miranda Court reinforced the idea that the
purpose of the warnings is to be a safeguard, ensuring individuals in
inherently coercive situations like custodial interrogations make a
conscious decision about whether to waive the privilege by reminding
individuals of their rights beforehand.106
If the Miranda warnings serve as merely a reminder, it necessarily
follows that they cannot be the source of or the starting point for an
individual’s Fifth Amendment rights, including the right to remain silent. Although the Supreme Court in 1966 intended to protect the
Fifth Amendment rights in certain situations, the Court’s language in
Miranda has led to confusion as to whether the right to remain silent
exists between the time of arrest and the receipt of the Miranda
warnings.107
102. See id. (discussing a reading of the Fifth Amendment that “afford[s] defendants
and suspects a right to remain silent”).
103. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
104. See Wamsley, supra note 58, at 935 (discussing the unintended consequences of
Miranda, particularly “an unclear timing issue about when [the Fifth Amendment] should be applicable”).
105. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added).
106. See Donald P. Judges & Stephen J. Cribari, Response, Speaking of Silence: A
Reply to Making Defendants Speak, 94 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 11, 23 (2009)
(pointing out that Miranda was an acknowledgement of what the Court had been
missing for decades—that the right to silence in inherently coercive situations,
like custodial interrogations, was “meaningless” without warning individuals of
their options under the Fifth Amendment).
107. See Wamsley, supra note 58, at 934.
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Silence as Compulsion

One argument put forth by the Eighth Circuit in support of admitting post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence in the prosecution’s case-in-chief
rests on the use of the word “compelled” in the Fifth Amendment.108
The Eighth Circuit argues that Fifth Amendment rights are not triggered until a defendant is under official compulsion to speak, and according to the circuit court, this does not exist until custodial
interrogation.109 However, the Eight Circuit’s argument in Frazier
was rather conclusory in nature and failed to examine what “compulsion” really means.110
Over the years, many courts have tried to provide guidance in determining when an investigator has compelled a statement. The “test
of voluntariness” is one method courts use to distinguish whether a
confession was voluntary or involuntary. The test of voluntariness
asks whether the confession was a “product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker.”111 It is important to note that this
test analyzes whether a confession should be excluded under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Fifth
Amendment.112 However, the justifications for the test are analogous
to those for the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination. Mainly, the methods and practices used to coerce involuntary
confessions go against the values of the accusatorial system—that the
prosecution must prove the defendant’s guilt with its own freely obtained evidence.113 Similarly, the Fifth Amendment is founded on the
108. This is a sound argument in theory, as one must assume the word “compelled”
was used purposefully in the Fifth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. However, the argument likely encompasses only a narrow and outdated vision of what
compulsion may entail.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1110 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The crux
of our inquiry today is to determine at what point a defendant is under ‘official
compulsion to speak’ because silence in the face of such compulsion constitutes a
‘statement’ for purposes of a Fifth Amendment inquiry.”).
110. The Eighth Circuit’s analysis in Frazier regarding compulsion went as follows:
“[T]he more precise issue is whether Frazier was under any compulsion to speak
at the time of his silence. He was not. Although Frazier was under arrest, there
was no governmental action at that point inducing his silence. Thus he was under
no government-imposed compulsion to speak.” Id. at 1111.
111. Picou, supra note 24 (citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)).
The Second Circuit provided a similar standard for the Fifth Amendment in
United States v. Familetti, 878 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2017). In Familetti, the Second
Circuit stated that “ ‘[I]nterrogation practices’ . . . may ‘disable an individual from
making a free and rational choice about speaking,’ negating the constitutional
force of subsequent Miranda warnings.” Familetti, 878 F.3d at 58 (emphasis added) (quoting Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611 (2004)).
112. See Picou, supra note 24, at 176–78.
113. Id. at 177.
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accusatorial system and, consequently, bans statements made under
compulsion.114
Another attempt to define compulsion focuses on what compulsion
is not—mere causation.115 For example, statements made during the
prosecution’s case-in-chief might cause the defendant to take the
stand. However, the causation in this scenario is not enough to say
that the defendant was compelled to testify because the defendant still
retained a choice that was likely influenced by a potential personal
benefit.116 On the contrary, suffering a penalty for refusing to answer
or make a statement may be enough to infer compulsion.117
The question then remains as to whether an arrest is enough to
compel a defendant to speak, thereby triggering Fifth Amendment
protections. While, initially, this question may seem arbitrary because
the issue of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence deals with the lack of a
statement, this is not the case. In some jurisdictions, the mere fact
that a defendant said nothing when police informed them of their
charges upon arrest can be used against the defendant at trial as evidence of guilt.118 The only way to combat such a proposition by the
prosecution would be for the defendant to make some statement showing anger or confusion about the arrest, as opposed to staying silent.
To determine whether a defendant’s silence is protected, it is necessary to decide whether a defendant’s statement is compelled under the
Fifth Amendment in jurisdictions where post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is permitted as substantive evidence of guilt.
This Comment urges the Supreme Court to find that this situation
does, in fact, compel the defendant to make some statement to defend
themself in order to avoid harsh consequences, particularly the use of
the defendant’s silence as evidence of guilt in the prosecution’s casein-chief. Under the voluntary test, the inquiry to determine compulsion is whether or not the statement is a result of a free and unconstrained choice. Here, a statement evidencing surprise or confusion
cannot be the result of a free choice if the defendant knows that the
absence of such a statement will result in an inference of guilt. The
looming penalty will control how the defendant responds.
114. See supra Part II; see also George C. Thomas III, An Assault on the Temple of
Miranda, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807, 821 (1995) (reviewing JOSEPH D.
GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW (1993)) (“Fifth Amendment compulsion is roughly coextensive with coercion and with common law
involuntariness.”).
115. See Thomas, supra note 114, at 820–21.
116. See id. at 820.
117. See id. at 821.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 2005) (allowing the
prosecution to introduce evidence that the defendant did not show any anger or
surprise after police told him that he was under arrest for suspicion of narcotics).
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Additionally, the interactions involved in an arrest—including notification of charges or questions regarding incriminating evidence—
provide more than mere causation for a defendant’s subsequent statement when silence would result in an implication of guilt. For instance, when police find incriminating evidence in an individual’s car,
the individual has no logical choice but to act surprised or produce an
explanation if they are in a jurisdiction that does not recognize a preMiranda right to remain silent. Again, the only other option—remaining silent and facing a severe penalty when the prosecution introduces
evidence of such silence to suggest their guilt at trial—is not a viable
one. Thus, the nature of this exchange reinforces the fact that the defendant is under compulsion to speak when arrested and confronted
with charges, incriminating evidence, or questions before they have
been read their Miranda warnings, which will afford them the Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent and not have that silence used
against them at trial.
The argument against the “cruel trilemma,” which advanced the
creation of the privilege against self-incrimination in England centuries ago, also supports the right to remain silent in post-arrest, preMiranda situations today. Using the above example, if police confront
the individual at the time of arrest after finding drugs in their car, the
person faces only self-penalizing options. If the person remains silent,
the prosecution can use such silence to imply knowledge of the drugs
and, therefore, suggest guilt in its case-in-chief. However, if the individual asserts that they did not know about the drugs, the prosecution
could impeach them. Moreover, if the individual admits to knowledge
of the drugs, they are, in essence, admitting their guilt. Whichever
option the defendant chooses, they will be incriminating themself—a
modern version of the cruel trilemma and the exact circumstance the
Fifth Amendment rights are designed to protect against.119 Therefore,
it is correct to conclude that a person’s right to remain silent extends
the post-arrest, pre-Miranda timeframe.
C.

Policy Justifications for Prohibiting Post-Arrest, PreMiranda Silence in the Prosecution’s Case-in-Chief

Arguing a defendant’s guilt using evidence that the defendant remained silent in the face of arrest prior to receiving their Miranda
warnings is problematic on several important policy grounds. First,
the Fifth Amendment, from which the right to remain silent is derived, was not meant to further just one specific purpose and should
119. See United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1032 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying a similar catch-22 argument).
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be construed broadly.120 The Supreme Court has noted the complexity
of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause and acknowledged that the privilege against self-incrimination was “founded on a
complex of values.”121 Moreover, the Court prescribes the overarching
goal of these values: to respect individuals, mainly by forcing the government to prove defendants’ guilt using its own freely obtained
evidence.122
Interpreting the right to remain silent in accord with the broad
purpose of the Fifth Amendment inevitably leads to the conclusion
that when in police custody, an individual’s choice to stay silent must
not lead to negative consequences in any situation where the individual’s choice to speak could be self-incriminating. This protection encompasses situations after arrest—even if police have not yet recited
the Miranda warnings. Anything contrary to allowing Fifth Amendment protections in post-arrest, pre-Miranda situations would effectively conflict with the purpose that the Supreme Court has given to
the privilege.
The second policy justification is centered around the Fifth Amendment’s effect on law enforcement. As a result of the Supreme Court’s
holding in Miranda, law enforcement officers are required to inform
individuals of their right to remain silent, among other things, before
engaging in any custodial interrogation.123 Currently, in the Seventh,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits’ jurisdictions, the exact timing of the Miranda warnings prior to custodial interrogation (for example, contemporaneous with arrest or hours later before beginning a custodial
interrogation) is not of significant concern to police officers or the prosecution because silence at any point after arrest cannot be used
against the defendant at trial to suggest guilt.
Conversely, law enforcement officers in the Fourth, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits’ jurisdictions are disincentivized from informing defendants of their Miranda rights simultaneously with, or soon after,
arrest.124 A police officer likely will be aware of, and use to their advantage, the fact that Miranda warnings, rather than arrest, are the
120. See United States v. Familetti, 878 F.2d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he ‘interrogation environment’ is not to be construed so narrowly as to defeat Miranda’s purpose . . . .” (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299 (1980))).
121. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); accord Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55–56 (1964) (discussing the values underlying the privilege against self-incrimination).
122. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
123. Id. at 467.
124. See Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free To Disregard Miranda, 112 YALE L.J. 447
(2002) (discussing the incentives for law enforcement to disregard the requirements of Miranda in order to achieve certain results, such as delaying Miranda
warnings in order to use a defendant’s silence to impeach them at trial); Hennes,
supra note 65, at 1036.
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trigger for Fifth Amendment protections for silence. Delaying the Miranda warnings increases the period during which a defendant’s silence will be admissible to prove guilt.125 The more time between
arrest and Miranda warnings, the higher the chances are that the defendant’s silence will occur in an incriminating situation. The Supreme Court must acknowledge and respond to this incentive to
withhold Miranda warnings to obtain incriminating silence in jurisdictions where the courts permit use of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as evidence of guilt. A failure to do so will only multiply the
inequities arising from this unconstitutional interpretation of the
right to remain silent.
In addition to law enforcement’s exploitation of interpretations allowing use of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence in the prosecution’s
case-in-chief, this alternate view generates confusion for criminal defendants. The right to remain silent is one of the most well-known
constitutional rights in the United States because of its presence in
every crime drama on television,126 where Miranda warnings are typically recited contemporaneously with an arrest. As a result, a typical
defendant is already aware of their right to silence when they are arrested and believes that the right is in effect. This may make the Miranda reminder seem redundant for most defendants. Whether or not
that is true, a problem does arise when individuals assume that their
right to silence begins at arrest, because in reality, police do not always recite Miranda at that time.127 Thus, the gap in time between
arrest and Miranda warnings will continue to subject many individuals to a high risk of self-incrimination until a nationally uniform rule
is put in place to guarantee the right to silence at arrest.
D.

The Confusion of Berghuis v. Thompkins on Post-Arrest,
Pre-Miranda Silence

The Supreme Court itself compounded the need for clarity on the
issue of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence with its holding in Berghuis
v. Thompkins, which sowed additional confusion regarding the prosecution’s use of such silence in its case-in-chief.128 In this case, police
arrested Thompkins on suspicion of murder.129 Before beginning the
interrogation, the police informed Thompkins of his Miranda rights,
but Thompkins refused to sign the form evidencing that he understood
his rights. Thompkins remained almost completely silent throughout
125. See Hennes, supra note 65, at 1036–37.
126. See Hapner, supra note 1.
127. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982); United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d
1102, 1107 (8th Cir. 2005).
128. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
129. Id. at 374.
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the interrogation.130 Nearly three hours into the interrogation, a police officer asked Thompkins whether he prayed to God for forgiveness
for shooting the victim. Thompkins answered, “Yes.”131 The trial court
admitted Thompkins’s statement into evidence over his objection that
it violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.132
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that remaining silent for a
prolonged period of time, like Thompkins during his interrogation,
was insufficient to invoke the right to remain silent.133 Instead, the
Court held that a defendant must unambiguously invoke his Miranda
right to remain silent.134 Because Thompkins’s silence alone was insufficient to invoke the right unambiguously, his response to the officer’s question hours into the interrogation operated as a waiver of
his right.135
The Court’s creation of the unambiguous invocation requirement
in Thompkins has only led to more questions. For purposes of this
Comment, Thompkins raises the issue of whether the right to remain
silent after arrest but prior to Miranda warnings is an automatic, selfexecuting right or if a defendant must clearly and verbally invoke
their right to remain silent at the time of arrest to avoid adverse consequences at trial.136
At the very least, a requirement that individuals must speak to
claim their right to remain silent is counterintuitive.137 This requirement is troubling, particularly in a pre-Miranda situation, because it
requires the arrestee to not only know that they have a right to re130. Id. at 375.
131. Id. at 376.
132. Id. Thompkins based his argument on the principle that he invoked his right to
remain silent by not speaking for a sufficient period of time and did not waive his
right by speaking two hours and forty-five minutes into the interrogation.
133. Id. at 380–81; see also Lauren Gottesman, Note, Protecting Juveniles’ Right To
Remain Silent: Dangers of the Thompkins Rule and Recommendations for Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2031, 2044 (2013) (“In this five–four decision, the Court
created a new, bright-line rule: an accused must affirmatively invoke his right to
silence—his silence alone is insufficient.” (footnote omitted)).
134. Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 381–82. The Court provides examples of statements that
would be sufficient to meet the unambiguous invocation requirement, such as “I
want to remain silent” and “I do not want to talk to police.” The Court also repeatedly refers to the right in Thompkins as the “Miranda right to remain silent.”
This is likely because Thompkins purportedly claimed his right to remain silent
after receiving his Miranda warnings and given an opportunity to expressly invoke the right. Id. at 382.
135. Id. at 388–89.
136. See Harvey Gee, Invoking the Right to Counsel and Right To Remain Silent: It’s
Just Not That Clear, 32 MISS. C.L. REV. 69, 77 (2013) (noting it is unclear
whether Thompkins’s unambiguous invocation standard applies to pre-waiver
situations).
137. See Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 391 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Charles Weisselberg
& Stephanos Bibas, The Right To Remain Silent, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA
69, 71 (2010).
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main silent but also know how to appropriately invoke that right.
Moreover, federal circuit court opinions after Thompkins reveal that
application of the unambiguous invocation rule is unpredictable.138
What is adequate in one jurisdiction to invoke the right is not always
adequate in another jurisdiction.139 The wide variety of things that
must go right for an arrestee to sufficiently invoke their right to silence decreases the chances that their post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence will be protected and not used against them in court.
However, it may be possible to distinguish Thompkins to prevent
the express invocation requirement from applying to post-arrest, preMiranda silence situations. The principal difference is that
Thompkins involved post-Miranda silence. The open-ended question
of which situations the express invocation rule applies to has not gone
unnoticed by the Supreme Court. The Court arguably admitted that
its holding in Thompkins applied only to post-Miranda silence,
thereby excluding pre-Miranda situations, when it later asserted that
Thompkins applies in the “context of post-Miranda silence.”140
The Supreme Court reasoned that an unambiguous invocation of
the right to remain silent after the receipt of Miranda warnings is
required because the defendant has “full comprehension of the rights
to remain silent and request an attorney.”141 In contrast, a defendant
does not always have the same comprehension of their right to remain
silent before they receive their Miranda warnings. This disparity
presents another reason the right to silence in post-arrest, pre-Miranda situations should not require express and unambiguous
invocation.
However, it is possible that this is a distinction without a difference, as the Supreme Court stated that the context of Salinas—prearrest silence—was “closely related” to Thompkins’s post-Miranda silence.142 If the Court determines that these two seemingly distinct
points in time are sufficiently related, it is possible that the Court will
refuse to find a meaningful difference between post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence and Thompkins’s post-Miranda silence for invoking the
right to silence. Whatever the outcome, Thompkins raises important
questions for the treatment of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence that
138. See Gottesman, supra note 133, at 2045–46.
139. Compare Hurd v. Terhune, 619 F.3d 1080, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2010) (responding
“no” and “I don’t want to do that” to officers’ request to reenact an event were
sufficient to invoke the defendant’s right to remain silent even though he never
said he wanted to remain silent), with United States v. Plugh, 648 F.3d 118, 125
(2d Cir. 2011) (refusing to waive one’s right to silence is insufficient to meet the
unambiguous invocation requirement).
140. Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 188 (2013).
141. Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 382.
142. Salinas, 570 U.S. at 188.
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the Supreme Court must necessarily address in conjunction with the
main issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
To some, it may appear that the Supreme Court’s consistent refusal to provide clarity to criminal defendants, police officers, defense
attorneys, and prosecutors regarding the use of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt indicates the issue’s
unimportance. However, the exact opposite is true. The use of postarrest, pre-Miranda silence in a prosecution’s case-in-chief as evidence of the defendant’s guilt is of utmost importance because it is a
clear violation of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent and privilege against self-incrimination.
This Comment argues that a criminal defendant’s right to remain
silent commences at the time of arrest rather than at the receipt of
Miranda warnings. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that
Miranda is merely a reminder of the right to remain silent, not the
trigger, and thus has no bearing on when the right is activated. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit’s argument that the Miranda warnings signify the requisite compulsion to trigger the right to silence is
misguided. In fact, an analysis of what constitutes compulsion shows
that defendants are compelled to speak at arrest if they are in a jurisdiction that allows post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as evidence of
guilt because there is a lack of free choice and harsh penalties.
A contrary interpretation of the right to silence would lead to undesirable consequences, such as law enforcement officers postponing Miranda warnings as long as possible to increase the chances that a
defendant’s silence after arrest may be used as incriminating evidence. Additionally, the Supreme Court must consider the effect on
the average person who believes that their right to remain silent exists automatically as soon as they are arrested. Finding otherwise
would penalize defendants and go against the main purpose of the
Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination: to protect individuals’ civil liberties by forcing the government to prove defendants’ guilt by its own freely obtained evidence. Accordingly, it is
crucial for the Supreme Court to hear this issue and prohibit such use
of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as a violation of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.

